Using a sample of both U.S. and international IPOs we find evidence of the following:
Introduction
IPO allocation policies favor institutional investors. This is well known, although rather less well documented, in the U.S. In this paper, we show that the same is true worldwide. Averaging across 36 countries and 1,005 IPOs between 1990 and 2000, we find that share allocations to institutional investors are virtually double those received by retail investors. The available evidence from the U.S. indicates much the same [see Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and Aggarwal (2000) ].
How should this empirical fact be interpreted? In the U.S., allocation policies are discretionary -there are no rules to guide or constrain investment bankers. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) argue that discretion can enable investment bankers to favor some investors over others and thereby improve price discovery and better serve the interests of issuing firms.
Outside the U.S., allocation discretion is frequently constrained and yet the end result, in allocations at least, appears much the same. On net then, is "discretion" a good thing or should allocation practices more accurately and pejoratively be thought of as "discriminatory"?
In the near future this question likely will receive considerable attention from both academics and policymakers as the recently begun investigation of allocation practices by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan begins to take shape. 1 Outside the U.S., bookbuilding, with its emphasis on discretionary allocation practices, has 1 Articles published in the Wall Street Journal during December 2000 alleged that some institutions were paying unusually high trading commissions in the hope of receiving IPO allocations and that some underwriters made allocations on the understanding that the recipients would buy additional shares in the open market. See Smith and Pulliam (2000) .
virtually supplanted the traditional fixed-price offering, and its pro rata allocation policy, in much of Continental Europe and increasingly in Asia [Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2000) ]. Thus the stage is set for serious consideration of the consequences of allocation practices for primary market performance.
In this paper we attempt to shed light on this rather complex question. The complexity begins with identifying an appropriate objective for allocation policies. The bulk of academic theory treats maximization of proceeds received by the issuer as the objective of pricing and allocation policies. Although there is merit in this assumption in the context of well-developed capital markets, it is less obviously appropriate for privatization IPOs or when it is hoped that broad share ownership will spur the development of secondary markets or serve some other public interest. Some might even argue for non-discriminatory allocations on egalitarian grounds regardless of the consequences for issuing firms.
For the purpose at hand, we implicitly take proceeds maximization net of the direct costs of issuance as the appropriate objective of a pricing and allocation policy. We believe this approach sheds more light on both the ongoing debate in the U.S. and will be more descriptive of primary markets worldwide in the future. But it also requires careful consideration of the source and magnitude of the indirect costs of issuance -initial public offerings are typically "underpriced", in the sense of large first-day price increases on average, and institutional investors are the primary beneficiaries. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) establish conditions under which this substantial indirect cost of bookbuilding reflects a quid pro quo arrangement embodied in the optimal mechanism for acquiring private information from institutional investors. Although discounts diminish the issuer's proceeds from the offering, in this view, expected proceeds decline under alternative allocation policies [Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) , Sherman and Titman (2000) ]. Constraints on the banker's allocation discretion are therefore likely to diminish the issuer's expected net proceeds.
Alternatively, allocation discretion might aggravate an agency problem between the issuer and its banker [Baron (1982) ] if it promotes collusion between bankers and institutional investors. Bankers deal repeatedly with institutional investors but infrequently with issuers.
Whereas Benveniste and Spindt assume that bankers use this asymmetry to the benefit of the issuer, Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (1999) derive the optimal price and allocation mechanism assuming that bankers and institutional investors collude to extract informational rents from issuers. Nevertheless, an optimal mechanism similar to bookbuilding arises in their setting, in which allocations favor informed investors and discounts compensate for revelation of private information. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2001) 
reinforce this apparent parallel between
France's Mise en vente auctions and bookbuilding by establishing conditions under which both implement the optimal price and allocation mechanism. Thus mechanism design theory generally predicts favorable treatment of institutional investors in circumstances where they maintain the informational upper hand.
The limited documentation of allocation policy in the literature appears consistent with this prediction. However, there are at least two reasons why it is premature to accept discretion as a good thing on the basis of these studies alone. First, it is conceivable that statistical tests of the mechanism design theory have been unable to reject the theory in spite of its weak explanatory power. Second, most studies have focused on relatively narrow, reduced-form tests of the theory, often ignoring serious endogeneity problems, rather than testing the broader structure implied by the mechanism design perspective. 2 In this paper, we estimate a structural model designed to put the theory to a more severe test. One noteworthy finding is that the theory survives our test.
Moreover, most existing tests of the theory have used data from the U.S. The problem with U.S. data, apart from the general unwillingness of U.S. banks to share information about their allocation policies, is that it provides no useful alternative for comparison. Banks maintain full allocation discretion in all U.S. firm-commitment IPOs. By contrast, the international data used in our analysis comprises a wide range of allocation policies subject to an equally wide range of regulatory constraints. At one extreme, the German primary markets are increasingly dominated by bookbuilding practices and, like the U.S., impose few constraints on how shares are allocated.
At the other extreme are countries like Australia where fixed price offerings with pro rata allocations are the default option given issuing firms. In the middle lie countries like France and the United Kingdom where issuers can select from a range of underwriting practices and banks are subject to a variety of constraints on the discretion they exercise in the allocation of shares.
The sample heterogeneity in allocation policy provides for identification of our structural econometric model. In turn, estimation sheds light on whether discretionary allocation is beneficial and if so under what circumstances. The following results should be of interest to policy makers:
• Constraints on bankers' allocation discretion reduce institutional allocations.
• Constraints on allocation discretion result in offer prices that deviate less from the indicative price range established prior to bankers' efforts to gauge demand among 2 See, for example, Hanley (1993), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) , Cornelli and Goldreich (2000) , and Aggarwal (2000) . The structural test performed by Biais et al, while considerably more general, suffers from limited data and, for our purposes, the fact that allocation policy in the Mise en vente, while discriminatory, provides bankers with limited discretion. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2000) , using data similar to ours, account for the econometric consequences of issuers selecting from a 'menu' of price and allocations mechanisms when they go public.
institutional investors. We interpret this as indicative of diminished information production.
• Initial returns are directly related to this measure of information production and inversely related to the fraction of shares allocated to institutional investors.
We tentatively conclude that discretionary allocation promotes price discovery in primary markets and diminishes the attendant costs of information production.
Sample and Data
Our dataset spans the period January 1990 to May 2000 and covers a large fraction of the IPOs brought to market worldwide during the decade. The 1990s are noteworthy for the purposes of this study for several reasons. Aside from the high level of primary market activity during the decade, the 1990s were also a period of unprecedented experimentation in the means by which issuing firms were marketed to investors. The sharp increase in global offerings required banks to develop mechanisms to appeal to a wide range of investor preferences and abide by a similarly wide range of regulatory constraints. The privatization movements in both Europe and Asia contributed to the experimentation by introducing a new breed of extremely large, mature firms to the primary markets and by encouraging the pursuit of broader interests like wealth redistribution [Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) ] and secondary market development [Pagano (1993) ] through share allocation policies. By the end of the decade, a large fraction of IPOs were carried out by methods that involved discretionary share allocation for at least part of the offering [Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) ].
Sample construction
We assemble a large dataset of initial public offerings by issuers from outside the U. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) for further details]; the SDC Global New Issues database, from which we extract all IPOs not already covered in Equityware (619 cases, of which 324 were conducted before January 1992 or after July 1999); information provided by European stock exchanges; a search of every article in Reuters' "Share issues" news archive for each of the 15 EU countries; and Ljungqvist's (1997) database of German IPOs. Every offering contained in these sources was checked for eligibility as a bona fide IPO against IPO prospectuses and regulatory filings. 3, 4 The EU15 sample is relatively comprehensive. In addition, we have access to a less comprehensive sample of 98 IPOs by issuers in non-EU Europe and 695 IPOs by issuers in the rest of the world (excluding the U.S.), over the period January 1992 to July 1999. These offerings were identified using Equityware.
Allocation data
The transparency of the distribution of shares between retail and institutional investors varies substantially across countries. In some countries there has been, like in the U.S., no requirement that this information be made public. Until recently, this was the case in Germany, so we approached companies directly to gather allocation data. There were 470 IPOs in Germany during our sample period. Of these, 377 were bookbuilding exercises, 92 were fixed-price offerings, and one was conducted by auction. [See Appendix A for details of offering mechanisms and allocation rules in Germany.] 3 We checked every IPO listed in SDC but not in Equityware and found that SDC frequently misclassifies seasoned offerings as IPOs and double-counts IPOs under different names. 4 We are grateful to Wolfgang Aussenegg, Jan Jakobsen, François Derrien and Giancarlo Giudici for filling gaps in our Austrian, Danish, French and Italian samples, respectively.
Bookbuilding became the dominant offering mechanism in 1995, accounting for 94% of German IPOs in 1995-2000. Our survey was conducted between May and June 2000 and targeted all 351 firms which went public in Germany between 1996 and March 2000 (we also contacted a sample of pre-1996 issuers in a trial but found that none could provide allocation data). Responses were received from 106 firms (30%). Of these, 93 disclosed their allocations to us, five said they no longer had the data, five were unwilling to make the data available, and three sent data pertaining to subsequent seasoned equity offerings. Our econometric model focuses on the IPOs in the four countries just described. In addition,
we have allocation data for 399 IPOs in other countries which we include for descriptive purposes. For some countries (for instance Finland), the data comes from filings with the local stock exchange. For the remainder, we rely on information about the final tranche structure in hybrid deals to infer retail and institutional allocations. Suppose that the issuer announces tranches of 1 million shares for retail investors and 2 million shares for institutions. This information is typically contained in the preliminary offering prospectus. Depending on local rules, the issuer may or may not reallocate between tranches in the light of relative demands. On the assumption that institutions do not submit bids pretending they are retail investors, and vice versa, we use the final tranche sizes to compute the institutional/retail split (taking into account the overallotment option, which frequently benefits institutions). Information regarding final tranche sizes is obtained from issuer reports to their stock exchange or press announcements by the underwriter or the issuer. Given this procedure, we are unable to infer allocations in nonhybrid offerings. IPOs for which we have allocation data, the average institutional allocation is 80%, though this reflects the large number of U.K. placings. Excluding these, the average drops to 68%.
A Global Perspective on IPO Allocations
From here on, we focus on IPOs in France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Because we do not have allocation data for every IPO in these countries, we are concerned about the potential for sample selection bias. As a first cut, Table 2 provides, for each of the four countries, summary statistics regarding offer size, underpricing, allocations to institutions, and the number of privatizations. For each country, we test for differences in means or medians between the full country sample (column [1] ) and the sample for which we have allocation data (column [2] ).
This reveals no significant differences in Germany or the U.K. In France, median gross proceeds is significantly higher amongst firms for which we have allocation data, reflecting the fact that smaller issuers are more likely to use an auction to price their securities. To see how representative our small U.S. sample is, we compare it to an SDC-generated sample of 4,541
IPOs in the U.S. between January 1990 and May 2000, which excludes unit and investment trust offerings. The U.S. offerings for which we have allocation data are significantly larger than the average or median U.S. IPO during the sample period.
Availability of allocation data is only a necessary condition for inclusion in our econometric model. In addition, we require data on the initial price range in order to measure the degree of price discovery in the pre-market. This requirement reduces the number of available IPOs from 843 to 231 in the U.K. (where indicative price ranges have not traditionally been disclosed publicly), with negligible losses in France (from 244 to 237) and Germany (from 144 to 141). Table 2 also provides tests for differences in means between the sample for which we have allocation data (column [2] ) and the reduced sample for which we have both allocation and price range information (column [3] ). There are some significant differences amongst the U.K.
offerings, which treble in terms of average and median offer size. This is largely due to the fact that we lack indicative price ranges for many placings. Before 1996, placings were confined to smaller issues (up to £15 million till December 1993, up to £25 million till December 1995), while larger issuers were compelled to use a hybrid. Due to the attrition amongst placings, average institutional allocations fall from 93% in column [2] to 86.3% in column [3] . We are also more likely to have allocation and price range data for privatizations, not surprisingly given their larger size.
Across the four countries, the average company raises $75 million, the median $28 million, and underpricing averages 26%. Amongst the 641 firms for which we have both allocation and price range information, the average company raises $215 million, the median $31 million, and underpricing averages 22%.
Given these patterns, we need to take sample selectivity bias seriously. We will outline a Heckman (1979) selectivity correction in the next section, after we have set out the theoretical
and empirical methodology used to analyze the 641 IPOs in France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. described in Table 2 .
The Determinants and Consequences of Allocation Policy
The theoretical framework derives from the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) perspective of discretionary allocation as a key element of the investment bank's effort to extract private information from potential investors prior to setting the offer price for an IPO. Allocation policy, in turn, is influenced by these strategic considerations and various constraints imposed by the regulatory regime under which the IPO is conducted. In the remainder of this section we outline the theory underpinning these elements of the econometric model and conclude with a discussion of the identification and estimation of the implied system of equations describing the market.
The precise definitions of all our variables can be found in Table 3 .
Price discovery in primary markets
By price discovery in the primary market we mean the degree to which prior expectations regarding the value of the offering, reflected in preliminary filings with the issuer's regulator, are revised in response to feedback from investors and the market at large before the offer price is set. Thus we think of the offer price as reflecting a conditional expectation representing the culmination of primary market price discovery. Following Cornelli and Goldreich (2000), we define the variable
Revision = (Offer Price -P low ) / (P high -P low )
to proxy for the learning reflected in the difference between these conditional and unconditional expectations. P high and P low are the upper and lower bounds of the indicative price range generally filed with the issuer's regulator prior to seeking feedback from institutional investors in the course of bookbuilding and hybrid offerings. In the U.S., for example, the price range is included in the S-1 filing with the SEC and is subject to restrictions that may require refiling the prospectus in the event that the offer price is set substantially outside the suggested price range [Boehmer and Fishe (2000) ].
By construction, Revision equals ½ if the offer price is set at the midpoint of the price range (indicating that no new information has emerged). However, when the signal-to-noise ratio for information generated by contemporaneous 9 If there are no contemporaneous IPOs, or none that use bookbuilding, m_Revision and σ_Revision are set to ½ and 0 respectively. 10 These variables are estimated using the full country samples described in column [1] of Table 2 . 11 We use the precise dates on which the price range and the offer price were set in each case. Note that these generally precede the announcement date by a day or two. Since we are here interested in the information set of the issuer and not of outside investors, we collect the earlier dates. We obtain these as follows: in France, from the market regulator (the Commission des Opérations de Bourse) and the Paris Bourse; in Germany, from the final IPO prospectus (which recapitulates the sequence of events); in the U.K., from the London Stock Exchange's Regulatory News Service and from the 'expected timetable of principal events' in the 'pathfinder' (preliminary) prospectus; in the U.S., SEC filing dates from Securities Data Company.
offerings is low, less learning occurs and so Revision should be negatively related to σ_Revision BB .
In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, discounted share allocations constitute the compensation provided in exchange for investors' private information. Other things equal, large price revisions, reflecting a greater yield of private information, will carry the expectation of a larger discount. This is the well-documented 'partial adjustment' phenomenon observed in both the U.S. [Hanley (1993) , Lowry and Schwert (2000) , and Loughran and Ritter (2001)] and worldwide [Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) ]. The partial adjustment phenomenon also suggests that if spillovers are important, contemporaneous revisions tell only part of the story. In isolation, a moderate positive contemporaneous revision might be interpreted as revealing only a moderate amount of information. But if it is coupled with a large initial return, the Benveniste-Spindt framework predicts the combination reflects a strong positive response.
We control for this effect by including the mean of the one-day initial return of all IPOs whose first trading day occurs during IPO i's bookbuilding phase, m_IR BB , in addition to the contemporaneous revision variables.
Secondary market spillovers are measured by the return to a local market index during each IPO's bookbuilding phase (MktRet BB ) as well as the standard deviation of daily index returns during the same period (σ_Mkt BB ). The latter is included because although large market movements might be reflective of the arrival of considerable new information bearing on an IPO's offer price, when volatility is high it is difficult to tease out its implications. So again, IPO
i's price revision should be directly related to MktRet BB and negatively related to σ_Mkt BB .
Controlling for these potential spillover effects, Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) predict that banker discretion promotes price discovery. The banker's level of discretion differs across the four countries and, in the case of France and the U.K., within countries. The various options facing issuers in France, Germany and the U.K. are outlined in Appendices A-C. Since it is impossible to quantify the relative discretion granted to bankers across deals we define two categories of constraints on banker discretion and outline these in Table 4 . UK offerings that fall within this broad category are designated with the dummy variable
BB_constraints.
The sample also includes 126 U.K. placings that can only be sold to institutional investors (ignoring the fact that ten of these set aside between ½% and 20% of the offer for their employees). This constraint undermines the potential for using retail investors as a fallback in bargaining with institutional investors over the terms under which they reveal private information [Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) ]. These offerings are designated with the dummy variable BB_placings. This clearly is a constraint on the banker's capacity for eliciting information from institutional investors but neither its absolute magnitude nor its magnitude relative to that of the constraints captured by BB_constraints are clear a priori.
The remaining offerings are classified as unconstrained bookbuilding efforts, such as those carried out in the U.S. and Germany. This category also includes dual-tranche deals which do not pre-commit the underwriter to particular tranche sizes, as in U.K. 'global offers' which typically state that the final tranche structure is to be decided after the offer closes, or French hybrid bookbuilding efforts which provide for the possibility of clawback (usually but not exclusively in favor retail investors) but leave the decision whether to exercise the clawback option with the underwriter.
Finally, note that the banker in the Benveniste-Spindt framework simultaneously determines how much to allocate to investors who relinquish private information and how much to revise the offer price in response, so what we observe is the equilibrium combination of quantity (allocations) and price (Revision). We therefore let Revision depend on allocations to institutional investors. Even after controlling for the level of explicit constraints on discretion, local custom or other circumstances might influence banker expectations regarding their capacity to favor certain investors in exchange for information. We therefore normalize ex post institutional allocations by the average institutional allocation in contemporaneous offerings (local offerings during the three months preceding firm i's IPO). This variable, which we call Inst_Alloc, will be greater than 1 if institutions are allocated more than is 'normal' in that market at that time. Clearly, Inst_Alloc is endogenous according to the Benveniste-Spindt framework, and our estimation will control for this.
In summary, the model of primary market price discovery to be estimated is:
Allocation policy
We assume that institutional investors are the primary source of any information extracted in the course of a bookbuilding effort and take Inst_Alloc as a reflection of the banker's allocation strategy. Thus large price revisions, if they derive from such information, should be associated with large institutional allocations, other things equal. Moreover, there is likely to be a nonlinearity in this relationship: particularly valuable information requires particularly favorable allocations to induce investors to truthfully reveal their information. We therefore include both
Revision and Revision+, the latter being equal to Revision whenever the offering is priced above the range, and zero otherwise. As argued earlier, price revisions should be viewed as being chosen simultaneously with allocations, so both Revision and Revision+ will be treated as endogenous.
However, large IPOs essentially provide more currency for compensating informed investors and so may diminish the fraction of the offering they will expect. We control for this effect by including the variable Proceeds which is defined as the natural log of gross proceeds raised in the offering denominated in U.S. dollars. This variable too is endogenous if issuers aim to minimize wealth losses associated with their offerings [Habib and Ljungqvist (2000) ].
We do not control separately for the regulatory constraints BB_constraints and BB_placings on allocations because our dependent variable Inst_Alloc measures institutional allocations relative to what is 'normal' in the local market, and so already takes into account the presence of constraints. We do, however, include a dummy variable indicating whether the offering was the result of a privatization of a state-owned firm. This reflects the fact that privatizations were quite commonly used as instruments of public policy aimed at broadening domestic share ownership or employee ownership [Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) ]. Either would tend to favor retail investors. Thus the model specification for the banker's allocation policy is:
Initial Returns
In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, discounted share allocations constitute the compensation provided in exchange for investors' private information. Other things equal, large price revisions, reflecting a greater yield of private information, will carry the expectation of a larger discount.
Again, there is likely to be a non-linearity in this relationship: particularly valuable information requires some combination of favorable allocations and initial return to induce information revelation. We therefore include both Revision and Revision+ in the initial return model.
Holding the quantity of information revealed constant and assuming institutional investors are the source of this information, the percentage discount should be negatively related to the fraction of shares allocated to institutional investors. In other words, investors' incentive compatibility constraint for sharing their information demands a minimum dollar compensation that can be satisfied by infinitely many combinations of share price and quantity.
Benveniste and Spindt argue that underwriters can reduce underpricing by 'bundling' deals.
Essentially, a higher deal flow affords underwriters the opportunity to cut off informed investors from other, lucrative deals as punishment for misrepresenting their private information. Higher (expected) deal flow should therefore lead to a lower marginal cost of acquiring information.
Similarly, Booth and Chua (1996) and Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2000) argue that during periods of high IPO volume, there is greater potential for issuers sharing the costs of information production, again leading to lower required underpricing returns. We control for this effect with the variable IPOVol which is defined as the number of IPOs in the six weeks before to two weeks after the present IPO's pricing date. 13 We include volume after the pricing date to allow for expectations regarding bundling with deals that are already in the pipeline. Clearly the eightweek window is arbitrary; experimenting with different window sizes, we find that the results become progressively weaker the longer the window but are not qualitatively altered with shorter windows.
Unlike in the U.S., where deals are typically priced only a few hours before trading begins, there is a substantial lag between pricing and trading in the three European countries [see Finally, we aim to control for firm-specific valuation uncertainty in three ways. Because privatization IPOs generally involve more mature firms for which, presumably, more information is in the public domain, their discounts should be smaller if discounts are at least in part compensation for private information. By the same reasoning, younger firms and firms in high-technology industries may be harder to value and thus carry higher initial returns. We therefore include a dummy for privatization IPOs, the natural log of one plus firm age at the time of the IPO, and a dummy which equals one for firms whose principal activities are in a high-tech industry.
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This yields the following model for initial returns: where Initial Return is defined as the percentage return from the offer price to the closing price on the fifth trading day following listing. This is the same convention used by Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) to obviate problems arising when daily price changes are subject 14 Since our sample firms come from different countries, there is no consistent SIC code that we can use to assign firms to the high-tech category. Instead, we base our assignments on a reading of each firm's business description as published in its prospectus. On this basis, 232 of the 641 firms are classified as high-tech. These operate in the following range of industries: biotech, pharmaceuticals, medical instruments, software and hardware development, communications technology, advanced electronics, and specialty chemicals. In addition, we classify internet-related businesses as high-tech. 15 Another popular proxy for uncertainty is offer size. This is a curious proxy, for it is clearly endogenous to the offer price. Moreover, Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) show that as a matter of identities, underpricing is strictly decreasing in offer size even when holding uncertainty constant. We thus refrain from using it. We note, though, that including it in the Initial Returns equation yields an insignificant coefficient and does not alter our findings.
to regulatory limits, as for instance in France. After-market prices were obtained from
Datastream and Equityware for non-U.S. offerings and from CRSP for U.S. offerings.
As an alternative to equation (3) 
Estimation
The two models defined by the three structural equations (1)- (3) and (1)- (3') cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares, for each equation includes amongst its explanatory variables the dependent variable of one or both of the other equations. Specifically, the Initial Return is endogenous to both Revision and Inst_Alloc, which in turn are endogenous to each other and to Proceeds, which is endogenous to the offer price and thus related to both Initial Return and
Revision. This has two consequences. First, it causes the endogenous variables to be correlated with the disturbances, leading to biased coefficients when estimated using OLS. Second, since some of the explanatory variables are the dependent variables of other equations in the system, the error terms are expected to be correlated across equations, leading OLS standard errors to be biased upwards. 
Selectivity bias
Given the potential for selectivity bias discussed earlier, we explore the effects of utilizing a Heckman (1979) correction. The procedure is as follows. In the first step, we estimate a selection equation of the probability of an observation being included in our final sample, using a probit on the full country samples of Table 2 , column [1] . The explanatory variables we use are the log of offer size and dummies for the country of listing and the IPO year. This equation has very good fit, with a pseudo-R 2 of 47.4%, and confirms that we are more likely to have complete information for larger offerings outside the U.S. and especially in France.
From this selection equation, we generate the inverse of the Mills' ratio which we use as an exogenous variable in the second step to estimate the structural model. The estimation is based on 2SLS rather than 3SLS, since the inclusion of the inverse Mills' ratio causes the disturbances to be heteroscedastic, and so the GLS weights are no longer correct. There is no known correction for this. [For further details regarding selectivity corrections in structural estimation, see Maddala (1983), pp. 234-235.] The coefficient estimate for the inverse Mills' ratio is very small in magnitude and insignificant in each of the three equations, and a Wald test of the joint hypothesis that all three coefficients are zero cannot be rejected (p-value=0.67). Moreover, only one coefficient estimate (discussed below) changes by more than two standard errors following the Heckman correction. Thus, although our final sample is not as comprehensive as we would like, this does not appear to lead to selectivity bias. Table 5 summarizes the three-stage least squares estimates of the model's structural parameters.
Results
We first focus on the system defined by equations (1) The positive and significant coefficient (p=3.7%) estimated for m_Revision is consistent with information revealed in contemporaneous offerings spilling over into the price discovery process.
However, the economic magnitude of the effect is smaller than that of institutional allocations: a one standard deviation increase in m_Revision from the mean increases Revisions from 0.65 to 0.7. At the same time, the negative coefficient estimated for σ_Revision (p<0.1%) is consistent with our prediction that the noisier is the information coming from other offerings, the less the offer price is increased relative to the indicative range. Underpricing of other deals during the bookbuilding phase, as measured by m_IR BB , also appears to spill over. The coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.1%), but its economic magnitude is again relatively small. A twoquartile increase in contemporaneous underpricing, from the 1 st quartile of 3.9% to the 3 rd quartile of 24%, increases average Revisions from 0.6 to 0.64.
The coefficient estimated for MktRet is positive, as predicted, and just about significant (p=9%), while that for σ_Mkt is significantly negative (p<0.1%). The former confirms that secondary market information, which is of course public, is taken into account when setting the offer price. The latter suggests that volatility in secondary markets -like volatility in the primary market -affects price discovery negatively, and its economic effect is quite large: a one standard deviation increase in volatility reduces Revisions from 0.65 to 0.57.
Taken together, the signs of our conditioning variables are strongly consistent with the Benveniste-Spindt framework and the notion of information spillovers. The coefficients are jointly highly significant, indicating good fit. Of course, other specifications are plausible. For example, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) find that pricing is influenced by both the presence of a U.S. bank as a senior member of the syndicate and the marketing of shares to U.S.
investors. Accounting for this leaves all other results unchanged without generating significant insights. This is not surprising in view of the fact that France, Germany and the U.K. are the European markets which involve U.S. investors and U.S. banks the least [Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) ].
The allocation equation yields one key insight: institutions are rewarded with above-normal allocations in return for revealing valuable information, the more so, the more positive the information. This is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients for Revision (p<1%)
and Revision+ (p=1.6%). To illustrate, increasing Revision from the mean of 0.65 to 1 (corresponding to pricing at the top of the range) is associated with a 3.6% increase in institutional allocations, while increasing Revision further, by one standard deviation to 1.5, is associated with a 42.4% increase in relative institutional allocations.
This result is consistent with efficiency in the strategic allocation framework if institutional investors are the primary source of private information. Other things equal, the expected cost of eliciting private information from investors is minimized when discounts are concentrated in states characterized by uniformly strong interest among investors which, presumably, are associated with the largest positive price revisions. This strategy minimizes leakage of surplus to investors providing weak indications of interest and therefore avoids undermining incentives for optimistic investors to be forthright with their opinions.
Consistent with our prediction that large IPOs provide more currency for compensating informed investors and so may diminish the fraction of the offering they will expect, we find that
LogProceeds is negatively and significantly related to institutional allocations (p<1%). Of course, this coefficient also reflects placings in the U.K., which tend to be smaller and exclude retail investors, but the coefficient on LogProceeds continues to be negative and significant if we control separately for placings.
Finally, we find no evidence of differences in allocations between privatizations and privatesector IPOs. Since privatizations tend to be large IPOs, it is conceivable that their effect on allocations is being subsumed in LogProceeds. To check whether this is the case, we interacted LogProceeds with the privatization dummy but found no differential effect of offer size on allocations between private-sector IPOs and privatizations.
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The underpricing equation provides strong evidence consistent with the notion of discounted share allocations being used strategically to encourage information production. First, we see strong confirmation of the partial adjustment phenomenon in the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimated for Revision (p<0.1%). Controlling for this effect, large institutional allocations are then associated with significantly smaller initial returns (p=1.2%).
This we interpret as evidence of a price/allocation tradeoff facing the banker. Other things equal, it suggests that constraints on banker discretion, which translate into smaller institutional allocations, increase the indirect costs of going public.
Interestingly, the coefficient on Revision+ is not significant. This implies that particularly positive information does not result in greater underpricing and thus more money being left on the table overall. Instead, as we saw in the allocations equation, informed investors are rewarded for disclosing such information with particularly favorable allocations.
The negative and significant coefficient estimate for IPOVol (p=1.5%) is consistent with the notion of bundling and with Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm's (2000) prediction that banks have sufficient market power to spread the costs of information production more uniformly across deals. Specifically, the indirect costs associated with underpricing are diminished when the issuer goes public during periods of heavy primary market activity (p=1.5%). The effect is 17 As mentioned in Section 4, there is one coefficient which changes by more than two standard errors under the Heckman correction: the coefficient on LogProceeds switches sign to become 0.009, while the privatization dummy becomes negative and significant. However, since the inverse Mills' ratio is invariably insignificant, this is more likely the effect of collinearity between LogProceeds and the inverse Mills' ratio than evidence of selectivity bias.
large in economic magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in IPO deal flow reduces underpricing from 22% to 17.7%.
The post-pricing spillover variables similarly have the expected signs and are significant. In particular, the contemporaneous market return between pricing and trading has a one-to-one effect on Initial Return.
Finally, other things equal, we find that companies in high-tech industries (p<1%) and younger companies (p=5.9%) are more underpriced, consistent with these variables capturing 
Conclusion
If our empirical model captures behavior in the market, there appears to be evidence of a strategic link between allocations and measures of price discovery and cost. On net, discretion appears a good thing. On the other hand, it is not hard to imagine that discretion could be used to undermine the interests of issuing firms. For example, it has been suggested that underpricing coupled with favoring institutional investors in the U.S. reflects bankers serving their own interests and those of repeat investors. The alleged kickbacks discussed in the context of the SEC's current investigation represent an extreme manifestation of this conjecture. Loughran and Ritter (2001) suggest that issuing firms might willingly put up with this kind of behavior even if it has no apparent benefit for them. Although our current findings cannot reject this hypothesis, they do provide tentative evidence that even if banks are self-serving in their exercise of discretion over the allocation of IPO shares there appear to be benefits for issuing firms as well.
We've qualified our conclusions not just because of the political nature of the question at hand but also because failure to reject the theoretical structure used in the analysis obviously does not imply that it accurately describes reality. Having said this, we contend that the mechanism design framework provides an attractive null hypothesis if for no other reason than that it implies a good deal more structure than alternative theoretical perspectives. The
Benveniste/Spindt framework is not a theory of underpricing. Rather it is a theory of the intermediary function in the primary market and the early stages of the secondary market [see Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (1996) for the secondary market linkage]. In this sense, the theoretical framework subsumes Rock's (1986) winner's curse model [see Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) ]. Biais et al. (1999) likewise extend the theoretical framework to subsume the agency concerns raised by Baron (1982) .
It is this considerable theoretical structure that enabled our estimation of the structural model tested here as opposed to the estimation of reduced form models more typical of the literature.
The fact that our estimation of the structural model is so fully consistent with the theory leads us to believe that our conclusions are less likely spurious inferences regarding the linkage between allocation discretion and market efficiency.
Appendix A. Offer rules and mechanisms in Germany
Offer mechanisms Issuers can choose freely between fixed-price offerings, auctions, and bookbuilding.
Allocation rules
Fixed-price offerings can be allocated in a discretionary fashion. Unless chosen by the issuer, there are no pro rata requirements etc.
In auctions, orders are filled in descending order. The limit set for the last order met determines the single strike price of the auction.
Individual exchanges can, in principle, impose restrictions on IPO allocations as part of their listing requirements. The Neuer Markt in Frankfurt, by far the most important exchange for IPOs in Germany, requires issuers to adhere to the allocation guidelines of the Exchange Expert Commission at the Federal Ministry of Finance.
The guidelines were issued on June 7, 2000 (that is, after our sample period). They are largely aimed at increasing the transparency of the allocation process. For instance, they require that the percentage allocated to retail investors be published after the conclusion of the offer. Article 12 deals with allocations to retail investors in the case of oversubscription after a bookbuilding exercise. The article is aimed at ruling out 'subjective' criteria for determining allocations. It recommends issuers draw lots, allocate pro rata (within certain order sizes or across the offer as a whole), allocate according to time priority, or some other 'objective criteria'. The article applies only to 'fair' treatment within the retail allocation, not to allocations to institutions or the relative split between institutional and retail allocations.
Prior to the issuance of these guidelines, IPO allocations were absolutely at the issuer's/syndicate's discretion. Invitation to the public to bid for securities of the issuer at or above a pre-specified minimum price. Bids must be limit orders; market orders are automatically deleted. Once bids are received, 'excessively high' bids are discarded. The Paris Bourse sets the single strike price at which orders are filled using the limit set on the last order met. If demand is excessive, the OPM can be repeated at a higher minimum price, or it can be converted into an offre à prix ferme (see below) at a (higher) fixed price.
Appendix B. Offer rules and mechanisms in France

Offre à prix ferme (previously known as Offre publique de vente)
Invitation to the public to subscribe for securities of the issuer at a fixed price (set in advance unless accompanied by a placement garanti, see below). Allocations are non-discretionary (pro-rated) except that issuers may invite subscriptions in Category A (usually up to 100 shares) and Category B (more than 100 shares) with preferential treatment (more favorable allocation/bid ratios) in Category A. In case of excessive demand (allocation/bid ratios below 0.8%), the OPF may be repeated at a higher fixed price. If combined with a placement garanti, the price set in the OPF cannot exceed the price set in the placement.
Placement garanti
Invitation to investors to participate in bookbuilding. Issuers may reserve the right to alter the price range. Allocations are at the bookrunner's discretion. In principle open to both retail and institutional investors.
Offre à prix ouvert
Invitation to (usually) retail investors to submit price/quantity bids within the indicative price range (limits included). Issuers may reserve the right to alter the price range. Always accompanied by a placement garanti aimed at institutional investors. Allocations are nondiscretionary conditional on the price bid, though as in an OPF, issuers can invite bids in Category A and B with preference shown to smaller orders. Introduced July 24, 1998. it as a collective noun for fixed-price offers. Public offers must be advertised in at least one national newspaper and are open to all.
In placings, shares are offered selectively, usually to City institutions. Private investors cannot normally apply. Shares may be set aside for employees.
Rules regarding choice of offer method
Until 1991, placings were allowed for offers raising up to £15 million, with public offers being mandatory for larger issues. Following the Initial Public Offers Review, chaired by Graham Ross Russell and which reported in July 1990, the LSE expanded the use of placings subject to making retail participation in IPOs mandatory for issues exceeding certain monetary thresholds. The new rules came into effect in January 1991. Companies offering between £15 million and £30 million were allowed to place their shares subject to the requirement that 75% or £15 million of the offer, whichever was the lesser, had to be offered to the public. The offer element could be satisfied via a traditional public offer or via the newly introduced 'intermediaries offer'. Issues raising more than £30 million should still come as public offers but the sponsor was free to place up to 50%. Issues raising less than £15 million should be conducted as placings. On 1 December 1993, the thresholds were raised. Below £25 million: placing. Between £25 million and £50 million: mandatory public offer component. Above £50 million: mandatory public offer.
From January 1995, the LSE allowed scientific research based companies to choose freely between placings, public offers and hybrids without regard to offer size (Amendment 4). In January 1996, the LSE abolished restrictions on retail participation for all types of issuers. Table 2 . Sample characteristics.
Whole sample [1] w/ allocation data [2] w/ allocation, price range data [3] t-test (z-test for medians): 
